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Abstract—Multi-Variant Execution Environments (MVEEs) are a promising technique to protect software against memory corruption
attacks. They transparently execute multiple, diversified variants (often referred to as replicae) of the software receiving the same
inputs. By enforcing and monitoring the lock-step execution of the replicae’s system calls, and by deploying diversity techniques that
prevent an attacker from simultaneously compromising multiple replicae, MVEEs can block attacks before they succeed. Existing
MVEEs cannot handle non-trivial multi-threaded programs because their undeterministic behavior introduces benign system call
inconsistencies in the replicae, which trigger false positive detections and deadlocks in the MVEEs. This paper for the first time extends
the generality of MVEEs to protect multi-threaded software by means of secure and efficient synchronization replication agents. On the
PARSEC 2.1 parallel benchmarks running with four worker threads, our prototype MVEE incurs a run-time overhead of only 1.32x.
Index Terms—replication, multi-threading, monitoring, determinism, developer effort, performance overhead
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1 MOTIVATION
Memory corruption vulnerabilities have been used to un-
dermine the security of computer systems for at least four
decades. To this day, new attacks appear shortly after new
mitigations are introduced and long before they can be put
into practice. A clear trend is that transparent mitigations
with low overheads are able to enter practice. Address Space
Layout Randomization [1], Stack Cookies [2] and Data Exe-
cution Prevention [3] are technologies that meet the high bar
to adoption. However, both the broadly deployed defenses
and many emerging ones have already been bypassed [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. Solutions that provide much
stronger protection are less transparent and involve more
overhead. They include Software-based Fault Isolation [12],
Control-Flow Integrity [13], Code-Pointer Integrity [14], and
Code Diversification [15].
The widespread availability of multi-core processors has
made Multi-Variant Execution Environments (MVEEs) [16],
[17] an increasingly attractive solution. MVEEs monitor
multiple instances, known as replicae, of the same program
running in parallel. When the MVEE detects inconsistencies
in the replicae’s I/O behavior, it considers those as symp-
toms of an ongoing attack and it terminates the replicae’s
execution to prevent harm.
The security guarantees provided by an MVEE build on
three properties: (i) isolation of the monitor from the repli-
cae; (ii) monitored lock-step system call execution; and (iii)
diversification of the replicae. The isolation of the monitor
by means of hardware-enforced boundaries is achieved by
implementing it in kernel-space [16] or in a separate user-
space process [18], [17], [19], [20], [21]. All system calls
invoked in the replicae are monitored, executed in lock-
step, and only allowed to execute when all replicae invoke
the same system calls with consistent inputs. This allows
the monitor to detect when a single replica is compromised
and to halt its execution. However, this also implies that
all replicae only progress at the speed of the slowest one.
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Furthermore, it implies that the monitor cannot look ahead
at future system calls when deciding if a specific system call
invocation should be allowed. This places strict constraints
on the system calls in the replicae. Foremost, they need to
occur in the same order in all replicae.
Those replicae are diversified instances of the same pro-
gram. Several techniques are suitable to generate the diver-
sified replicae, including include Address Space Partition-
ing [18], Reverse Stack Growth [22], System Call Number
Randomization [23] and Disjoint Code Layout [24]. All of
these techniques aim to introduce enough diversity to cause
detectable divergences in the system call behavior of repli-
cae under attack, while maintaining consistent system call
behavior if the inputs are benign. This task is complicated by
the fact that the system call behavior does not solely depend
on explicit, user-provided program inputs, but might also
depend on implicit inputs.
We prevent benign system call consistency violations
that result from implicit inputs, such as randomized vir-
tual addresses that affect the system call behavior through
address-dependent computations, by using implicit-input
replication agents [21]. These agents log the implicit inputs
in one replica, the master, and replicate those inputs in
the other replicae, the slaves, thus restoring system call
consistency. Together with the system calls, the points at
which these agents intervene form the so-called rendez-vous
points (RVPs) of the replicae.
In this work, we focus on a big weakness of exist-
ing secure MVEEs with respect to system call consistency:
secure replication of non-deterministic multi-threaded ap-
plications. In real-life multi-threaded programs, even the
security-sensitive system calls that should be monitored
most strictly often differ between replicae as a result of
their non-deterministic scheduling. Because of the lock-step
system call execution and monitoring requirement, security-
oriented MVEEs cannot tolerate those divergences.
Two broad classes of techniques could potentially alle-
viate this problem. First, a Deterministic Multi-Threading
(DMT) system can be embedded in the program to enforce a
fixed thread schedule in all replicae [25], [26], [27], [28], [29],
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2[30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35]. In the context of an MVEE,
however, all existing DMT systems fall short. To establish a
deterministic schedule, they all rely, in one way or another,
on a token. Some systems only allow threads to pass this
token when they invoke a synchronization operation. This
approach is incompatible with threads that deliberately wait
in an infinite loop for an event such as the delivery of a
signal to trigger because such threads may never invoke a
synchronization operation. Other systems allow threads to
pass their token when they have executed a certain number
of instructions. Such systems cannot tolerate variations in
the program execution and are therefore incompatible with
most code diversification techniques as well as the implicit-
input replication agents.
Alternatively, we can accept non-determinism and re-
quire only that all replicae execute in the same non-
deterministic order. Online Record/Replay (R+R) systems
can provide this guarantee by logging the execution in one
replica and replaying it in the other replicae [36], [37], [38].
R+R systems are less sensitive to variations in the program
execution, which we typically see with diversified replicae.
But in order to use them in a security-oriented MVEE, they
need to be adapted to become address-agnostic and to sup-
port programs that use ad hoc (i.e. non-standardized) syn-
chonization primitives or lock-free algorithms. Furthermore,
for embedding an R+R system in a security-oriented MVEE
we need to ensure that any new functionality introduced in
the replicae must be neutral with respect to the RVPs, and
we need to secure the communication channel that is used to
convey the information about the recorded execution from
the master replica to the slave replicae.
Our paper makes four contributions. First, we present
four R+R-based synchronization replication agents that
record synchronization operations in a master replica and
replay them in the slaves, thus ensuring system call con-
sistency. The agents are address-agnostic and system-call-
neutral, and hence compatible with existing secure MVEEs
and implicit-input replication agents. The most efficient
agent communicates over a channel that is secured against
malicious communication by attackers.
Second, we present a practical strategy to extend our
R+R-based systems to support ad hoc and lock-free synchro-
nization, which we typically see in many low-level libraries.
Third, we report how we integrated our replication
agents into GNU’s glibc and how we applied the aforemen-
tioned strategy to four commonly used system libraries:
GNU’s libpthreads, libstdc++ and libgomp. This integration
enables support for data race free C and C++ programs that
use the pthread and/or OpenMP programming models.
Finally, we extensively evaluate the run-time perfor-
mance of our replication agents, the implementation effort
that went into their integration into the aforementioned
libraries, and the security of the proposed features.
2 REPLICATION OF MULTI-THREADED PROGRAMS
The techniques presented in this paper build on
GHUMVEE, an existing security-oriented MVEE [21], [24].
To monitor the replicae, GHUMVEE uses the ptrace and
process vm * Linux APIs. As the use of these APIs involves
context switching, they introduce significant latencies in
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Fig. 1: System overview
the interaction between the monitor and the replicae. This
makes them unacceptable for replicating synchronization
events, which occur frequently in many programs and
which are often handled entirely in user space in the orig-
inal programs to optimize performance. For example, we
observed gcalctool, a simple calculator from the GNOME
desktop environment performing 1.8M futex operations
during its 400 ms initialization, almost all of which were
uncontended and hence handled in user space. Interposing
all those operations with system calls and ptrace made the
initialization time grow to over 370 seconds, a slowdown
with a factor 925!
To avoid such an unacceptable overhead, our alternative
solution consists of a synchronization replication agent that
replicates all synchronization events entirely in user space.
2.1 Synchronization Replication Agent
We enforce an equivalent execution in all replicae by inject-
ing a synchronization replication agent into their address
space, as shown in Figure 1. At run time this agent forces
the master replica to capture the order of all inter-thread
synchronization operations, hereafter referred to as sync ops.
The agent logs the captured order in a circular, shared buffer
that is visible to all replicae. This buffer is mapped with
read/write permission in the master replica and with read-
only permission, and at different addresses, in the slave
replicae. In the slave replicae, the agent uses the captured
order to enforce an equivalent replay of sync ops.
To capture the sync op execution order, we wrap them
in a small critical section at the source code level. Within the
critical section we first log information about the sync op
in the first available slot of the buffer and then perform the
original op. Depending on the agent we use, the information
about the sync op consists of the thread ID, the memory
word that was affected by the op, and the op’s type.
The replication agent must be available to the entire
program, including any loaded shared libraries. So we chose
to implement the agent in glibc, at the lowest possible level
in the user-mode portion of the software stack where it is
exposed to the program itself and to all shared libraries.
The same agent is used in the master and slave replicae:
Identical instances of glibc are loaded into the master and
slave replicae when they are launched, though they might
be loaded different addresses in each replica. When an in-
stance is later invoked at run time, it needs to know whether
it is invoked in a master or slave replicae, to either capture or
replay the sync op order. We therefore dynamically initialize
the agent in each replica. Soon after a replica is launched
by the MVEE monitor, its agent invokes a system call that
is intercepted by the monitor. Through this system call, the
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Fig. 2: Replay sequences with three replication strategies
agent passes the location of its status flags to the monitor. At
that point, and at each later intervention from the monitor
in the replicae, the monitor can configure the agent instance
as a master or slave agent. Through the status flags, the
monitor can also disable the agent when the replicae are
executing a single thread, and enable the agent when the
replicae (are about to) start executing multiple threads. From
that initial configuration onwards, the agent in each replica
communicates only with the agents in the other replicae.
With the exception of being enabled/disabled, the agents
do not communicate with the monitor. This avoids the
extensive context switches that would result from using the
ptrace or process vm * APIs for replication.
While the high-level principles of our replication agents
are reminiscent of online R+R techniques, we cannot triv-
ially adopt them. Within an MVEE, it is critical that any
new functionality injected into the original code is neutral
with respect to RVPs. Specifically, we have to ensure that if
the new functionality introduces a new RVP, this RVP is
introduced in all replicae at the exact same point in the
program execution and with equivalent arguments. Further-
more, because a secure MVEE needs to enforce lock-step
execution on the replicae, we need to replicate information
actively and with minimal delay to avoid that slave replicae
delay the master replica too much. We therefore implement
replication agents that make the recorded information visible
immediately, rather than broadcasting it periodically.
These two design decisions have far-reaching conse-
quences. First, the RVP-neutrality constraint prevents us
from using dynamic memory allocators, because those use
sync ops to coordinate multi-threaded access to the mem-
ory, and introduce system call RVPs to allocate additional
memory pages and to change protection flags.
Second, since we want any information to be visible
immediately in the slave replicae, the agent cannot per-
form any post-processing on the recorded information. This
prevents us from compressing the recorded information to
reduce our agents’ memory bandwidth requirements.
Third, our agent must support diversified replicae. It can
therefore not assume that the master and slave replicae are
fully identical. For example, the same mutex might be found
at different addresses in the different replicae. Consequently,
the recording side of the replication agent must record its
information in a manner that is address-agnostic.
2.2 Replication Strategies
To replay the sync ops in the slave replicae, several ap-
proaches are available that trade CPU cycles off against
memory pressure. We have implemented three replication
strategies that meet the aforementioned constraints.
2.2.1 Total-order replication agent
Our total-order (TO) replication agent replays all sync ops in
the exact same order in which they happened in the master
replica. Figure 2(a) shows two threads that execute under
GHUMVEE’s control. In the master replica, thread M1 first
enters and leaves a critical section protected by lock A at
times t0 and t1 resp. At those times, the wrappers of the
corresponding sync ops log the activities of thread M1 in
the replication buffer. Next, thread M2 in the master replica
enters and leaves a critical section protected by lock B at
times t2 and t3 resp. These events are also logged in order
in the buffer. Right after t3, the buffer holds the contents
indicated in the figure. Time stamps to the left and right of
the buffer mark the time the buffer elements are produced
and consumed resp. The arrows on the left and right denote
the position of the producer and the consumer pointers resp.
right after t3.
In the slave replica thread S2, corresponding to M2 in
the master replica, reaches the critical section protected by
lock B first, at time t4. At that time, the first element in the
buffer indicates that synchronization events in the master
replica occurred in thread M1 first, so thread S2 is stalled
in the wrapper of the sync op in enter sec. Only after the
first two elements in the buffer are consumed in thread S1
at times t5 and t6, can thread S2 continue executing. Thus,
even though the two critical sections protected by locks A
and B are unrelated, thread S2 is forced to stall until thread
S1 has replayed the operations performed by thread M1.
This agent is trivial to implement, but not very efficient:
The lack of lookahead by consumers introduces unnecessary
stalls as indicated by the red bar in Figure 2(a).
42.2.2 Partial-order replication agent
Our partial-order (PO) replication agent is more efficient.
It only enforces a total order on dependent sync ops. This
agent may replay independent sync ops in any order, as long
as it preserves sequential consistency within the thread. The
PO agent is more complex and introduces more memory
pressure because the agents in the slave threads have to scan
a window in the buffer to look ahead. However, it typically
introduces much less stalling and generally outperforms the
TO agent. In Figure 2(b), we see the exact same order of
events as in Figure 2(a) until t4. This time, however, thread
S2 may enter the critical section without delay at t4 because
the enter sec operation does not depend on either of the
operations that preceded it in the recorded total order.
Conceptually, there are significant similarities between
this agent and online R+R techniques such as LSA [36] and
offline R+R techniques such as RecPlay [39]. However, our
agent captures events at a finer granularity of sync ops in-
stead of pthread-based synchronization operations. Further-
more, our agent is fully RVP-neutral. These are relatively
minor differences, however, as techniques like LSA can be
adapted to capture at a lower granularity and to use only
statically allocated memory. A more fundamental differ-
ence is that our agent also supports diversified replicae.
With queue projection, LSA discards the per-thread order
of synchronization operations and only maintains the per-
variable order. With diversified replicae, the same logical
variable might be stored at different addresses in different
replicae. Our agent therefore relies on the per-thread order
to determine which logical variable is affected by each
synchronization operation.
Altough the PO agent eliminates unneccessary stalling,
it still suffers from poor scalability. The master replica must
safely coordinate access to the circular buffer by determin-
ing the next free position in which it can log an operation.
If many threads simultaneously log synchronization events,
this inevitably leads to read-write sharing on the variable
that stores the next free position. A similar problem exists
on the slave replicae’s side because they must keep track
of which data has been consumed. With multiple slave
replicae, this also leads to high sharing and, consequently,
high cache pressure and cache coherency traffic.
2.2.3 Wall-of-clocks replication agent
The above observation led us to the design a third agent.
This wall-of-clocks (WoC) agent assigns each distinct mem-
ory location that is ever involved in a sync op to a logical
clock. These clocks capture “happens-before” relationships
between related sync ops [40]. Similar to, e.g., plausible
clocks, but without using clock vectors, our clocks only
capture the necessary relationships [41].
In Figure 2(c), lock A stored at address &A is assigned to
clock cA. Lock B is similarly assigned to clock cB.
On the master side, the agent logs the identifier of
the logical clock associated with each sync op, as well as
that clock’s time. After logging each sync op, the agent
increments the logical clock time of the associated clock.
In this agent, the logging is no longer done in a sin-
gle circular buffer. Instead there is one circular buffer per
master thread, such that each buffer has only one producer.
In Figure 2(c), master thread M1 only communicates with
slave thread S1 through buffer 1, whereas thread M2 only
communicates with thread S2 through buffer 2. This design
avoids the contention for access to the shared buffers.
Neither the master nor the slave replicae need to propa-
gate their current buffer positions to other threads. Further-
more, the master’s logical clocks do not need to be visible
to the slaves. The information contained within the circular
buffers suffices for the slave replicae to replay the same clock
increments on their own local copies of each clock.
In Figure 2(c), thread M1 first enters a critical section
protected by lock A at time t0. The agent observes that the
current time on logical clock cA is 0. It records the clock and
its time in buffer 1 and increments the clock’s time to 1. At
time t1, the agent logs the exit from the critical section in
buffer 1. This time around, the logical clock time is 1.
A similar situation then unfolds in thread M2 at time t2.
This time though, the critical section is protected by lock B,
of which the associated memory location is assigned to clock
cB, whose initial time also is 0. This information is logged in
circular buffer 2, along with information regarding the exit
of the critical section in thread M2 at time t3. At that point,
clock cB is incremented to 2.
In thread M1, a third critical section is entered at time
t4, which is again protected by lock B. This event involving
logical clock cB is logged in buffer 1 with clock time 2.
On the slave replica’s side, the threads are scheduled
differently in our example. There, thread S2 reaches a sync
op first, at time t5. The agent observes in buffer 2 that it
must wait until clock cB reaches time 0. Since this is the
initial time on the slave’s copy of that clock, the operation
can be executed right away and thread S2 will increment
the time on its copy of cB to 1. If we suppose that thread S2
is then pre-empted and thread S1 gets scheduled, S1 will
enter and leave the critical section protected by lock A at
times t6 and t7, consuming the first two entries in buffer 1,
thereby incrementing the slave copy of clock cA to 2.
The third operation in thread S1 at time t8 is the most
interesting. In the first replication buffer, the slave agent
observes that the sync op to enter a critical section has to
wait until its associated logical clock cB has reached time 2.
However, in the slave, that clock’s time was last incremented
at time t5, i.e., to the value of 1. Thread S1 must therefore
wait until some other slave thread has incremented the
time on cB. This will happen at time t9 in thread S2.
Shortly thereafter, the agent code executing in thread S1 will
observe that cB has reached the necessary value, and at t10
S1 will enter its second critical section.
With this WoC, the replication agent only inserts ac-
cesses to shared data, and hence coherence traffic, for two
reasons. First, it introduces accesses to replication buffers
shared between corresponding threads in the master and
slave replicae. This is a fundamentally unavoidable form of
overhead required to replicate the synchronization behavior
from the master to the slave replicae.
Secondly, the agent inserts accesses to shared clocks
whenever multiple threads in the original program were
already contending for locks at shared memory locations.
While these extra shared accesses in the replication agents
still introduce some overhead, we do expect the overhead to
scale with the pre-existing resource contention in the orig-
5inal application. In other words, if the original application
uses contended global locks that decrease the available par-
allelism, the replication agent will hurt it further. However,
if the original application involves a lot of synchronization,
but that synchronization is performed using uncontended
local locks, the WoC replication agent will not introduce
contended traffic within the master or slave replicae either.
As we will see in Section 3, the WoC agent consistently
outperforms the other agents on almost every benchmark.
Most importantly, as is the case with plausible clocks in
general, the replication will always be correct [41].
One important remark remains to be made, however.
While the WoC agent is certainly the more elegant and
more efficient of the three proposed designs, it is not fully
optimal. Due to the RVP-neutrality constraint, we cannot
dynamically assign each memory location to its own private
clock. Instead, we have to pre-allocate a fixed number of
clocks statically and we have to assign lock memory loca-
tions to one of those clocks based on a hash of their memory
address. Because we want to use a cheap hash function,
hash collusions are quite likely. Any such collusion results
in an m-to-1 mapping between multiple locks and each
clock. In other words, the WoC agent is bound to assign
some non-conflicting memory locations to the same logical
clock. When this happens, this introduces unnecessary seri-
alization and hence potentially also unnecessary stalls in the
slave replicae.
Our WoC agent is similar to Respec [37], although it does
not share any part of its implementation. It differs from
other clock-based techniques, however, in that it does not
use thread clocks. Instead, our agent relies solely on the
logical clock it assigns to each memory location. In the ideal
case, our agent therefore only needs to read and update the
value of one clock to replay a synchronization operation.
Techniques that rely on Lamport clocks (e.g. ROLT [42]) by
contrast need to read and update the values of two clocks:
the local thread clock and the synchronization variable’s
associated clock. Techniques that rely on vector clocks (e.g.
RecPlay [39]) need to read the value of at least n+ 1 clocks
(with n the number of threads in the program): the local
thread clock, the synchronization variable’s clock, and the
thread clocks of all other threads. The reason why our agent
does not need local thread clocks is that it records into a per-
thread buffer, rather than a globally shared buffer. Therefore,
a thread clock would never have to be synchronized with
other thread clocks, which eliminates the need for such a
clock altogether. Furthermore, the fact that our agent assigns
each memory location to a statically allocated clock implies
that the agent can be applied transparently and that it
respects RVP-neutrality.
2.3 Secured wall-of-clocks agent
The agents implementing the three replication strategies
as discussed in the last sections are not very secure: They
forward information through a circular buffer that is shared
among all replicae. This buffer easy to locate since all three
of these agents store a pointer to it in a thread-local variable.
Despite of the code reuse countermeasures we have in
place [24], attackers could exploit the fact that an easily lo-
catable communication channel between the replicae exists
to set up an attack that can compromise multiple replicae.
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Fig. 3: Hidden buffer array access to the replication buffer.
As the WoC agent outperforms the other two agents on
average, we build on that agent to present an alternative,
secured design that relies on the hidden buffer array (HBA)
shown in Figure 3. This page-sized array stores pointers to
hidden buffers. Upon startup, a replica can request that this
HBA be allocated by GHUMVEE and subsequently map it
into its own address space using the System V IPC API [43].
GHUMVEE intercepts and manipulates this mapping call
such that the pointer to the HBA is not returned to the
program. At the same time though, GHUMVEE overrides
the base address of the replica’s gs segment so that it points
to the HBA.
The reason to override this address is that the x86 64
architecture supports addressing of 48-bit (or bigger) point-
ers and has therefore disabled most of the original x86
segmentation functionality. The gs and fs segment registers
may still be used as additional base registers, however, and
by consequence all gs or fs-relative memory accesses are still
valid. It is extremely uncommon to still find such accesses
in x86 64 software, however. Furthermore, x86 processors
do not allow user-space instructions to read the segment
registers. The gs and fs segments can therefore be used to
store pointers that are hidden from the user-space software.
At a fixed offset within the HBA we store a pointer to the
agent’s circular buffer. The end result is that the replica must
read the pointer to the circular buffer indirectly, through
a gs-relative memory access. In assembler, we manually
crafted a version of our WoC agent that accesses this pointer
in such a way. By storing the pointer to the buffer and
any pointers derived from it in a fixed caller-saved general-
purpose register, we guarantee that the pointer never leaks
to memory and that no function outside the replication
agent can observe the pointer value. We further guarantee
that (i) the pointer to the buffer is never moved to a different
register, (ii) the register is never pushed onto the stack, (iii)
the register is cleared before the function returns and (iv)
the replication agent does not call any functions while the
pointer value is visible.
Since neither gcc, nor LLVM offers syntactic sugar to al-
low for such properties, we have chosen to implement both
of the replication agent’s functions that access the shared
buffer in assembly code. The current implementation, which
we evaluate in Section 3, totals approximately 150 LoC.
6 1!!!void*!thread_func(void*!param)!{!
 2!!!!!pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);!
 3!!!!!int!tmp!=!input_1!*!4;!
 4!!!!!int!result!=!do_work(tmp!+!42);!
 5!!!!!pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);!
 6 
 7!!!!!while!(!__sync_bool_compare_and_swap(&spinlock,!!
 8!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!UNLOCKED,!LOCKED));!
 9!!!!!work_items_processed!++;!
10  outputs[work_items_processed]!=!result;!
11  spinlock!=!UNLOCKED; 
12 
13  if!(atomic_decrement_test(&threads_remaining))!
14      pause();!
15  exit(0);!
16!!}!
WD!SD! GD!
A global!variables!
A local!variables!
highUlevel!synchronizaWon!
adUhoc!synchronizaWon!
ordered!operaWon!
Fig. 4: Comparison between three classes of determinism.
2.4 Embedding the replication agent
The key challenge in embedding the replication agent into a
program is to identify all sync ops. Because we want to wrap
these sync ops in the source code itself, we also identify the
sync ops at the source code level.
Existing R+R systems, as well as DMT systems that im-
pose weak determinism, only order invocations of pthread-
based synchronization functions. That is insufficient for
a secure MVEE because glibc and several other low-level
libraries implement their own sync ops. A failure to order
the sync ops in glibc tends not to affect the user-observable
I/O determinism of the program, but it does impact the
general system call behavior and hence violates the system
call consistency needed in a secure MVEE.
An alternative strategy would be to order all sync ops
by wrapping all loads and stores in the program. This
would yield system call consistency even in the presence
of data races. Ordering individual loads and stores leads to
prohibitively high overhead however, as was demonstrated
in the context of strong determinism [33]. Moreover, given
the range of diversity we need to support in the replicae
to mitigate a sufficiently wide range of attacks, there is
no guaranteed one-to-one mapping between the loads and
stores in the different replicae.
The strategy we propose is most similar to weak de-
terminism systems, but we capture sync ops at a lower
level as shown in Figure 4. In existing strong determinism
systems, all 11 memory operations need to be ordered.
(Lines 3, 9, and 10 each involve two memory operations.)
With existing systems of weak determinism, only the two
(standard synchronization) operations on the mutex on lines
2 and 5 are ordered. In our solution, we wrap both the
standard operations on the mutexes as well as the three
ad hoc synchronization events on lines 7, 11 and 13. The
latter one translates into a LOCK SUB instruction on the x86
architecture, and atomically sets the zero flag (ZF).
To identify the source lines to be wrapped, we first iden-
tify the sync ops in the binary code, and then translate those
to source line numbers by means of debug information.
The relevant sync ops in the binary code come in three
categories. First, any instructions that the programmer ex-
plicitly marks as atomic are sync ops. On the x86 archi-
tecture, this includes all instructions with an explicit LOCK
prefix, as well as XCHG instructions with an implicit LOCK
prefix [44]. LOCK CMPXCHG is an example. Second, any
store operation (e.g., for a C assignment to a dereferenced
pointer or volatile variable) that directly succeeds an explicit
memory barrier is a sync op. Such stores are typically used
in synchronization schemes like read-copy-update (RCU).
Third, any instruction that references a memory-address
(such as some memory-allocated variable) that is referenced
by another sync op also becomes a sync op. We refer to
these operations as unprotected loads and stores, a terminology
sometimes used to denote benign data races.
The guarantees we provide by running a replication
agent that enforces an equivalent order of sync ops in
all replicae are at least as strong as the guarantees that
weak determinism provides. To see why, recall that weak
determinism enforces a deterministic order of entries into
critical sections. Thus, in a correct program, weak determin-
ism will grant mutually exclusive access to related blocks
of shared memory in a deterministic order. Though this
was historically not the case [45], all modern user-mode
programs that run on SMP-systems now implement mutual
exclusion using an atomic test-and-set operation [46], [47].
On x86 systems, several instructions provide test-and-set
semantics, but they are atomic only if a LOCK prefix is used.
Consequently, the first category contains all instructions that
may implement the entrance into a critical section as a
sync op. Operations that implement the exit from a critical
section can either be implemented using atomic test-and-
set or exchange operations (second category) or with atomic
store operations (first or third category).
On the GNU/Linux platform, all high-level synchroniza-
tion primitives in the pthreads, OpenMP and C++ standard
libraries are based on the mutual exclusion principle. In the
pthreads library, e.g., functions such as pthread mutex lock
and pthread cond wait implement mutual exclusion using
LOCK CMPXCHG instructions. In the implementation of
other high-level synchronization primitives, a variety of
atomic test-and-set operations are used. All of them are
prepended with LOCK prefixes, however, and all of them
are therefore classified as sync ops.
The identification and wrapping of sync ops is currently
a partially manual process. First, we disassemble the bina-
ry/library to identify explicit memory barrier instructions
or instructions with explicit or implicit LOCK prefixes. If no
such instructions are present, no further steps are needed.
We use debugging symbols to map all of the identified
instructions to their originating source line. For memory
barriers, we wrap the store that directly succeeds the barrier
in calls to our replication API. We identify loads of the same
variable and wrap them too. To some extent, we thus fix
benign and deliberate data races, such as when developers
use such a barrier to set a flag without synchronization.
For source lines that compile into instructions with LOCK
prefixes, check whether or not compiler intrinsics are used
to express the atomic operations. If not, we insert calls to
our replication API before and after the operation. Other-
wise, we include an automatically generated header in the
source file. This header overrides all known intrinsics that
implement atomic operations and inserts the appropriate
7replication API calls automatically. It is generated by a
simple script that downloads the list of all atomic compiler
intrinisics from the GNU GCC website, parses the list and
generates the necessary definitions. In addition, we identify
other loads and stores of the variables involved in the atomic
operations and insert API calls manually.
While this process might seem cumbersome, it is impor-
tant to note that unless a program or higher-level library
implements its own ad hoc synchronization or lock-free
algorithms, no memory barriers or instructions with LOCK
prefixes will be found. So most programs are supported
transparently. For our tests, only four libraries needed
modifications. We report extensively on the size of these
modifications in Section 3.1.
In many cases, and in particular in portable code, the
manual effort to invest in these modifications is very limited.
In portable code, compiler intrisics are used to implement
atomic operations, as well as all other accesses to the vari-
ables involved in those atomic operations. This is necessary
to ensure portability to architectures that do not guarantee
the atomicity of aligned loads and stores. To wrap all the
necessary compiler intrinsics, it suffices to include our auto-
matically generated header in all source files.
Furthermore, even for programs and libraries that do
need more modifications, the patching process can be
streamlined to a great extent. C++11 compliant compilers
provide a template for atomic operations [48]. With this
template, a programmer can mark variables that need to
be updated atomically by modifying their type, i.e., by
wrapping the type in the std::atomic template. During the
compilation, the compiler translates all accesses to such
variables such that the appropriate atomic intrinsic is used
for every access. Our automatically generated header can
then insert the appropriate calls to our replication API
automatically by overriding these intrinsics. In summary, if
we use a C++11 compliant compiler, the patching effort can
be limited to modifying the type of all variables that need
to be accessed and updated atomically. In our future work,
we plan to extend our current embryonic implementation in
LLVM to automate this process completely.
The replication-enabled libraries can replace their orig-
inal counterparts, in which case they will function cor-
rectly and with minimal overhead outside the MVEE con-
text. Alternatively, they can be installed side-by-side with
the original ones, in which case the MVEE will intervene
transparently in the library loading to load the replication-
enabled ones. Our solution hence places a minimal burden
on system administrators and users.
2.5 Interaction with the Kernel
Synchronization algorithms often rely on the kernel’s futex
API to interact with other threads and processes. The multi-
purpose synchronization API is exposed through a system
call, and is used throughout GNU’s pthreads library for
two reasons. First, some functions use the FUTEX WAIT
operation to block the calling thread until the value stored
at a specified address changes. In the pthread mutex lock
function, this operation is used to block the calling thread
if the mutex is currently contended. Other functions such
as pthread cond wait use the FUTEX WAIT operation to
block until an event occurs. Other functions use the FU-
TEX WAKE or FUTEX CMP REQUEUE operation to signal
threads that are waiting for the value at the specified
address to change. In the pthread mutex unlock function,
wake operations are used to wake up threads that are
blocked in a related pthread mutex lock call. Functions such
as pthread cond signal or pthread cond broadcast use wake
operations to signal and wake up threads that are blocked
inside a related pthread cond wait call.
A potential issue arises when a thread performs a wake
operation for which only one other thread should be woken
up. If more than one thread is waiting in each replica and
the replication agent does not intervene, the kernel might
wake up non-corresponding threads in the replicae. In a
slave replica, the woken thread will then stall indefinitely
(i.e., deadlock) at the first atomic op it encounters.
While this issue can be handled in the replication agents
embedded in all replicae, we chose to tackle the issue from
within GHUMVEE’s monitor instead. The monitor allows
all replicae to invoke futex calls but it allows only the master
replicae to actually complete the call. The monitor manip-
ulates the system call number and arguments for the slave
replicae’s futex calls to have them perform a harmless non-
blocking system call instead (such as sys getpid). The non-
blocking call returns immediately from the kernel, at which
point the monitor stalls the slave until the master’s futex
call has also returned. At that point, the monitor replicates
the result of the system call to all slaves and resumes them.
This guarantees that the corresponding threads get woken
up in all replicae. By implementing the logic in the monitor
instead of in the agent, we keep the agent small and fast for
its other replication tasks. The additional overhead of going
through the monitor is relatively small, given that it already
intercepts all system calls invocations and returns anyway.
3 EVALUATION
Our implementation of GHUMVEE supports the i386 and
AMD64 architectures for the GNU/Linux platform but there
are no fundamental restrictions to either the architectures, or
the platform: All design options we lifted for GHUMVEE
target applications running on top of an unmodified OS
running on a commercial off-the-shelf multi-core processor.
GHUMVEE has already been tested successfully on
desktop programs [24], [21]. In this paper, we focus on
evaluating the replication of explicitly parallel benchmarks,
on the effort needed to patch libraries and to embed our
synchronization replication agent, and on how the replica-
tion buffers might enable attacks. As underlying diversity
scheme to mitigate code reuse attacks, GHUMVEE imple-
ments Disjount Code Layouts (DCL). DCL ensures that any
given virtual address points to a valid executable region in
no more than one replica. This policy was demonstrated to
provide effective protection against code reuse attacks [24].
3.1 Embedding the replication agent
To evaluate the run-time overhead of GHUMVEE, we used
the PARSEC 2.1 benchmark suite. We did not include the
facesim and canneal benchmarks because they contain many
data races. For canneal, this is hardly surprising as it is based
8on data race recovery. We applied minor patches1 to four
benchmarks to eliminate data races or to embed our agent.
ferret raced on the cnt enqueue and input end variables. Ad-
ditionally, the imagick library on which ferret depends con-
tained unprotected accesses to the free segments variable.
freqmine raced on the thread begin status variable. raytrace
used ad hoc synchronization in its AtomicCounter class. vips
had an unprotected read and write in the gclosure.c file.
We further applied fixes for bugs which had been re-
ported in the literature or on the PARSEC web site. We con-
figured fluidanimate and streamcluster benchmarks to use the
original pthread-based barriers rather than the semantically
equivalent but less efficient parsec-based barriers.
On our testing system, the benchmark suite relies on four
libraries in which we embedded our replication agent: glibc
2.19, libpthread 2.19, libstdc++ 4.8.2 and libgomp 4.8.2, the
default library versions of Ubuntu 14.04. Since libpthread and
glibc are built from the same source tree, we treat them as
one entity when reporting the required patching effort.
For libgomp and libstc++, we leverage the use of compiler
intrisics as discussed in Section 2.4. Both libraries sup-
port specialized targets and more generic targets: libstdc++
supports the so-called i486 and generic CPU targets, while
libgomp supports the so-called Linux and POSIX targets.
We adapted the makefiles, directory structures, and linker
scripts to ensure that the code targeting the generic CPU
and POSIX are used instead of the code in support of the
more specific i486 and Linux targets, thus ensuring that
code relying on compiler intrisics is used instead of code
involving inline assembly. Furthermore, we made sure that
the automatically generated header was included in all
relevant source files.
For each of the libraries, all of this preparation required
editing/executing less than 14 lines of script and source
code. The automatically generated header consists of 131
LoC. In addition, in libgomp, 2 lines of code needed to be
edited to replace two unprotected load/store operations by
atomic ones. So all in all, a very limited effort was required
to prepare these libraries: 2*14+2=30 lines of code needed
to be edited manually to prepare the two libraries that total
about 110k LoC. Moreover, this manual editing was limited
to 4 source files out of a total of 673 files.
A considerably larger patching effort was needed to
embed our agent in glibc/libpthread, because they use ad
hoc synchronization throughout and have many explicit
memory barriers and unprotected loads and stores.
Whereas more modern glibc/libpthread ports like the
ARM port use compiler intrinsics to implement their atomic
operations, the AMD64 and i386 ports do not, presumably
because intrinsic support in compilers was not up to par yet
when those ports were developed. Instead, the AMD64 and
i386 ports rely on inline assembler. With today’s compiler
support for intrinsics, the inline assembler can be replaced
by intrinsics without performance penalty. In addition, our
effort for embedding the replication agent in glibc would
have been much reduced in case the inline assembler had
already been replaced by the intrinsics. As this is not yet the
case, we needed to do the replacement ourselves. For this
1. At http://ghumvee.elis.ugent.be our patches, raw data and scripts
are available. GHUMVEE will be open sourced in Q4 2015.
purpose, we replaced the x86 version of the lowlevellock.h
header by the ARM version of that same file. We also deleted
the assembly-based x86-specific versions of many pthread
functions from the source tree, such that the generic versions
of those same functions are used instead.
This did not suffice, however. Contrary to libgomp and
libstc++, glibc’s generic code does not use compiler intrinsics
directly. Instead, glibc implements its own series of sync ops,
of which some map directly to compiler intrinsics and others
do not. So we opted to wrap glibc’s sync ops manually,
rather than with the automatically generated header. Our
manually constructed wrappers span 211 lines of code. We
added an additional 175 lines of code to allow ld-linux, which
is also built from glibc’s source tree, to still use the original
unwrapped macros as needed by GHUMVEE. We therefore
needed 386 lines of code in total to wrap all synchronization
operations in glibc-libpthread. In addition, we added approx.
261 lines of code to eliminate data races.
Finally, we added 14 lines in one of glibc’s linker scripts
to expose our replication agent to other libraries, and added
our replication agent itself. The WoC agent, for example,
counts no more than 194 lines of C code, while the secure
WoC agent counts 167 lines of assembly code and 100 lines
of C code.
Excluding the copying and deleting of existing code,
as well as our own replication agent, the source code
patching effort to prepare glibc/libpthread was limited to
211+175+261+14 = 661 LoC in 60 source code and build files.
Compared to the library’s total size of several 100K LoC
spread over several thousand source code files, this effort is
still fairly limited. And all of it can of course be reused for
replicating all applications.
Moreover, since version 2.20, a gradual effort is ongoing
in the glibc developer community to replace inline assem-
bler sync ops by their more portable, more generic, more
maintainable counterparts in the form of compiler intrinsics.
Together with the automated support we are developing as
mentioned near the end of Section 2.4, this will reduce the
required patching effort significantly in the near future.
3.2 Run-time overhead and scalability
We evaluated our technique on a system with two Intel Xeon
E5-2650L processors with 8 physical cores and 20MB cache
each. The system has 128GB of main memory and runs the
AMD64 version of the Ubuntu 14.04 OS. For the sake of
reproducibility, we disabled hyper-threading and all power
saving and dynamic frequency and voltage scaling features.
The system runs a Linux 3.13.9 kernel that was compiled
with a 1000Hz tick rate to minimize the monitor’s latency
in reacting to system calls. We applied a small optional
kernel patch (less than 10 LOC) that adds a variant of
the sys sched yield system call that bypasses GHUMVEE.
Other than that, no kernel patches were used. With this
small kernel patch, our agents can efficiently yield the
CPU whenever they are waiting for preceding sync ops to
finish replaying in the slave replicae. This patch improves
the performance of our TO and WoC agents in the dedup
benchmark but has no significant effects elsewhere.
All benchmarks were compiled at optimization level -O2
using GCC 4.8.2. The native performance of the benchmarks
9was measured using the original, unpatched libraries that
shipped with the OS. GHUMVEE performance was mea-
sured using their GHUMVEE-enabled versions.
We measured the execution time overhead of our agents
by running each PARSEC benchmark with 1 to 8 worker
threads natively as well as in GHUMVEE with 2, 3, and
4 replicae. Using the native PARSEC input sets, i.e., the
largest standardized set, we ran each measurement five
times, of which we omitted the first to account for I/O-
cache warmup. For 1, 2, 4, and 8 worker threads, Figure 5
presents the benchmarks’ execution time as replicated by
GHUMVEE, relative to the native versions. For each agent
and for each benchmark, Figure 6 shows how the native
and the replicated execution (for two replicae) scales with
the number of worker threads.
These figures display several trends. Most importantly,
with both WoC agents, many benchmarks (blackscholes,
freqmine, raytrace, swaptions, and even streamcluster) can be
replicated with little overhead up to 8 worker threads, and
in some cases even with 3 or 4 replicae. Other benchmarks
(bodytrack, ferret, vips, x264) can be replicated with little
overhead up to 4 worker threads. The average overhead of
the replication remains below 2x for 2 replicae with the WoC
agents, even with 8 worker threads. With more replicae, the
overhead clearly increases. This is of course the result of
resource contention of the many threads over the limited
number of cores. For most of the mentioned benchmarks, it
then does not matter too much which agent is used.
For other benchmarks, however, there is a big difference
in overhead between the different agents, and there are
several benchmarks for which significantly larger overheads
and bad scaling are observed.
First, regardless of which agent we use, dedup consis-
tently suffers high performance penalties. The main con-
tributor to this overhead is the high system call density in
dedup. When running with 8 worker threads, dedup executes
over 123k system calls/second. This density is far greater
than in any other program we have tested so far. In the
PARSEC suite itself, the highest density we have measured
besides dedup was for the vips benchmark (20.9k system
calls/second for 8 worker threads). In older benchmark
suites such as SPEC CPU2006, the highest density we have
measured was around 1k system calls/second for 403.gcc.
The high overhead in benchmarks with such high system
call densities is unfortunately a fundamental problem of the
ptrace API on which GHUMVEE and most other security-
oriented MVEEs rely to monitor the behavior of the replicae.
Second, the swaptions and fluidanimate benchmarks,
which use fine-grained synchronization, expose a major bot-
tleneck in our PO and TO agents. Both of these benchmarks
use a fork/join threading model and frequent, fine-grained
synchronization. In both of these benchmarks, all worker
threads perform the same tasks and progress at roughly
the same pace. While swaptions does not use any explicit
synchronization in the application code itself, it does rely
heavily on dynamic memory allocation. The dynamic mem-
ory allocator in GNU’s libc uses ad hoc synchronization and
lock-free algorithms to ensure thread safety. Through libc,
swaptions executes more than 398M sync ops when running
with 5 worker threads. With 8 worker threads, swaptions
performs over 403M sync ops. This corresponds to 4.2M
sync ops per second in the native benchmark with 5 worker
threads, and up to 7.5M sync ops per second in the native
benchmark with 8 worker threads.
In fluidanimate, the situation is even worse. Contrary
to swaptions, fluidanimate does invoke our replication agent
directly. With 4 worker threads, fluidanimate performs over
1.18B sync ops, which corresponds to over 9.8M sync
ops per second in the native benchmark. These sync
ops originate mainly from the pthread mutex lock and
pthread mutex unlock functions, which are used to acquire
or release one of the 2.31M individual mutexes used in the
program. With 8 worker threads, fluidanimate performs over
2.35B sync ops, which corresponds to over 32.9M sync ops
per second in the native benchmark. Because the lock and
unlock operations are spread over so many different mu-
texes, there is very little contention in the native benchmark.
In GHUMVEE, however, the TO and PO agents create a
lot of contention. Both agents capture the total order of the
sync ops in a single circular buffer. To capture this order, the
agents acquire a lock before executing the original atomic
op and do not release this lock until the operation has
been logged in the buffer. These agents therefore effectively
serialize the execution of sync ops in the master replica.
A second problem with these two agents is that all repli-
cae must keep track of their current position in the buffer.
This position must be read before the processing of each
atomic op, and updated after each atomic up. Every time
an update happens on a different core that does not share
a cache with the core on which the previous update was
executed, the cache line that contains the current position in
the circular buffer will be invalidated, and hence cause stalls
in the cores’ pipelines.
The combination of these two bottlenecks results in poor
scaling for swaptions and fluidanimate. In other benchmarks,
the effects of the serialization and the additional cache
coherence traffic incurred by our TO and PO agents are
less visible. The main reason is that the other benchmarks
perform much less sync ops than swaptions and fluidanimate.
In the other benchmarks, the highest sync op rates occurred
for dedup and vips, with 936K and 644K sync ops per second
in the native benchmark resp.
Most importantly, our WoC agents almost completely
eliminate the bottlenecks observed in the swaptions and
fluidanimate benchmarks. Only in the vips benchmark, these
agents cannot avoid a significant serialization overhead
when the number of worker threads increases, because it
assigns many unrelated mutexes to the same logical clocks.
Thus, for this specific benchmark, the PO agent outperforms
the WoC agents.
A final trend is that benchmarks that use condition
variables do not scale well beyond 6 worker threads. The
bodytrack, dedup, ferret, vips and x264 benchmarks all rely
on condition variables to signal and to wake up threads.
With enough available CPU time, all of the benchmark’s
threads can run simultaneously and a thread can be signaled
without resorting to sys futex calls. The five mentioned
benchmarks all have heterogeneous threading models and
have more than n threads running simultaneously (with
n the number of worker threads). For that reason, our
machine’s 16 cores simply cannot run all threads in 2 or
more replicae simultaneously.
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Fig. 5: GHUMVEE execution time overhead, relative to native execution of Parsec 2.1 applications for different numbers of
worker threads. Each stack for each benchmark shows the overhead for 2, 3, and 4 replicae. The four stacks per
benchmark correspond to the three (non-secured) agents + the secure version of the WoC agent.
All in all, the WoC agents perform reasonably well. With
4 worker threads and two replicae, the average slowdown
of our MVEE is only 1.33x with the regular WoC agent and
1.32x with the secured WoC agent. With the TO and PO
agents, the average slowdown is 1.73x and 1.64x resp. The
high system call overhead in the dedup benchmark is the
main contributor to the slowdown. In this configuration, the
slowdown in dedup ranges from 2.98x with the WoC agent
to 4.19x with the TO agent.
With 8 worker threads and two replicae, the average
slowdown is much higher. The slowdown for our TO, PO,
WoC and secured WoC agents is 3.69x, 3.42x, 1.99x, and
1.98x resp. For our TO and PO agents, the main cause is the
introduced serialization and constant cache invalidations
that come with the single circular buffer approach. Our WoC
agents eliminate this bottleneck for the most part, but in
this configuration, the lack of resources on our test machine
becomes a problem. The variations in results for the WoC
agents are caused by minor differences in their implemen-
tation. The regular WoC agent accesses the synchronization
replication buffer directly, whereas the secured WoC agent
accesses the buffer indirectly, as we explained in Section 2.3.
This indirection slightly increases the cache pressure. As
opposed to the regular WoC agent’s C implementation
however, the secured WoC agent’s hand-written assembler
implementation does not spill any registers to the stack.
This optimization slightly reduces the cache pressure. The
combination of these two minor implementation differences
slightly favors the secured WoC agent in terms of perfor-
mance.
3.3 Security Evaluation
All of our replication agents rely on a buffer that is shared
between all replicae. This buffer is mapped as a read-write
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Fig. 6: Scaling of the native (i.e., pthreads) and replicated benchmarks (for two replicae, one master and one slave) with
the four different replication agents. On the X-axis, the number of worker threads is given. On the Y-axis, the performance
relative to one worker thread is presented. Fluidanimate only runs when the number of worker threads is a power of two.
memory segment in the master replica and as a read-only
segment in the slave replicae. Intuitively, it might seem
like a security risk to create such a communication channel
between the replicae because it can be used to forward
information from the master to the slave replicae without
triggering a monitored RVP. In practice, however, the secu-
rity risk is minimal.
In principle, it is possible to launch attacks that cause the
master replica to write arbitrary data into the buffer, but the
master replica cannot instruct the slave replicae to use the
arbitrary data in any meaningful way other than to replay
synchronization operations, because the data written into
the synchronization buffer is only read by the replication
agent. We have manually audited our replication agents and
verified that they never pass any information they retrieve
from the synchronization buffer on to any other part of the
program. GHUMVEE further ensures that explicit input, i.e.,
input retrieved from system calls, is never written into the
synchronization buffer.
We do, however, anticipate future MVEE designs in
which the MVEE does not arbitrate all system calls that
may retrieve input. For example, the recently proposed
reliability-oriented VARAN handles system call monitoring
and input replication entirely in user space and inside the
context and address space of the replicae [49]. In such a
system, the synchronization buffer could in theory be used
as an uncontrolled communication channel, which might
aid a compromised master replica in mounting an attack
on the slave replicae. Specifically, the compromised master
replica could manipulate the return values of its system
calls, thereby instructing the slave replicae to read further
input from the synchronization buffer.
To protect the synchronization replication buffer in this
scenario, GHUMVEE forces the buffer to be mapped at
different, randomized addresses in each replica. A compro-
mised master replica therefore would not know the exact
location of the buffer in the slave replicae and it would
have to derive the location through information leakage
or by guessing. Alternatively, the master replica could try
to construct a code reuse attack that invokes the replication
agent’s code to read from the synchronization buffer.
GHUMVEE prevents the latter attack with its DCL. The
master replica can therefore not mount a code reuse attack:
He cannot assume that slave replicae have the same memory
layout as the master replica, and if he feeds an address to the
replicae that points to an executable gadget in the master’s
address space, the slave will raise an exception when it tries
to execute code at the same address.
Guessing the location of the buffer is hard. GHUMVEE
currently use synchronization buffers of 256MiB, which
corresponds to 65536 memory pages. The AMD64 ABI
allows user-space applications to use 48 bits for memory
addressing but excludes the first memory page, i.e., the
page that starts at address 0x0. Therefore, a user-space
application may map up to 236 − 2 memory pages. The
chance to blindly guess the location of a 256MiB buffer in
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one slave replica is therefore 65536/(236− 2) or 9, 53 · 10−7.
Forcing the slave replicae to leak the location of their
synchronization buffer is not trivial either. While the TO,
PO and regular WoC agents do internally store a pointer
to the synchronization buffer, GHUMVEE prevents leakage
of the pointer from the slaves to the master through the
buffer by mapping the buffer as read-only in the slaves. As
GHUMVEE intercepts all system calls, it is trivial to prevent
a replica from reverting that memory protection.
Leaking the pointer through other channels is still pos-
sible, however. We have therefore constructed our secured
WoC agent, which significantly reduces the odds of a suc-
cessful leakage attack. This secured agent does not store a
pointer to the synchronization buffer, but instead accesses
the synchronization buffer only through an indirection via
the gs segment, as explained in Section 2.3.
A remaining option to consider is the use of a covert
channel between the replicae, and to use the MVEE as the
medium through which the covert channel communicates.
For example, the replicae can deliberately delay each other
by exploiting the MVEE’s lock-step execution mechanism.
This mechanism dictates that certain operations may only
be completed when all replicae attempt to invoke them.
The length of the delay can represent information such as
individual bits of a pointer value. While it is easy to write
programs that intentionally set up and exploit such chan-
nels, it is not possible to deploy this technique if the MVEE’s
protection policy is properly implemented. In GHUMVEE,
DCL prohibits the launch of a code reuse attack (to setup
and exploit the covert channels) in the first place.
In conclusion, we believe that our synchronization repli-
cation buffers and agents are sufficiently hardened against
attacks, even in scenarios where the master replica can
forward explicit input to the slave replicae via those buffers.
4 RELATED WORK
4.1 MVEEs
Throughout the last decade, several MVEEs have been
presented. Cox et al. first proposed N-Variant Systems,
a kernel-space MVEE [16]. Shortly afterwards, Cavallaro
presented a proof-of-concept user-space MVEE [18]. Sala-
mat et al. then proposed Orchestra, a more advanced
user-space MVEE [17]. More recently, Hosek and Cadar
presented Mx [20] and VARAN [49], while Maurer and
Brumley introduced Tachyon [19]. The latter three systems
are not security-oriented MVEEs like the former ones, as
they aim at safe testing of experimental software updates,
rather than at protecting programs against exploits. The
only multi-threaded applications on which VARAN was
tested were server applications in which none of the system
call behavior depends on the thread synchronization order:
Those server benchmark threads perform almost completely
independent computations. By contrast, the system call be-
havior in the PARSEC benchmarks, even our data race free
versions, depends very much on the synchronization order.
Without replicating and ordering synchronization events,
none of the PARSEC benchmarks can be handled correctly.
VARAN’s approach of ordering system calls and signals
but not synchronization events, is simply not a generic,
reliable solution. While not reported in detail in this paper,
we also successfully tested GHUMVEE on all benchmarks
on which VARAN and all other mentioned MVEEs were
reportedly evaluated. While some of those MVEEs have
been evaluated on multi-process applications (such as older
version of Apache), GHUMVEE is the first to provide active
support for non-deterministic, multi-threaded applications.
4.2 Deterministic Multithreading
Deterministic MultiThreading (DMT) systems impose a de-
terministic schedule on the execution order of instructions
that participate in inter-thread communication, or a de-
terministic schedule on the order in which the effects of
those instructions become visible to other threads. Some
DMT systems guarantee determinism only in the absence
of data races (weak determinism), while others work even for
programs with data races (strong determinism).
Some DMT implementations, especially the older ones,
rely on custom hardware [33], [50], [51], [38] or a custom
operating system [52], [53]. Of interest to us, however, are
the user-space software-based approaches [25], [26], [27],
[28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35].
Software-based DMT systems come in many flavors but
essentially, they all establish a deterministic schedule by
passing a token. We refer to the literature for an excellent
overview of the possible ways to implement the deter-
ministic schedule, as well as their implications [54]. In the
remainder of this discussion, we focus on the fundamental
reason why DMT systems are incompatible with MVEEs
that run diversified replicae: the timing of and prerequisites
for the deterministic token passing.
Most DMT systems require that all threads synchronize
at a global barrier before they can pass their token. Some of
the systems that employ such a global barrier, insert calls
to the barrier function only when a thread executes a syn-
chronization operation [25], [26], [27], [28]. This approach
is incompatible with parallel programs in which threads
deliberately wait in an infinite loop for an asynchronous
event such as the delivery of a signal to trigger. Such threads
never reach the global barrier. Other DMT systems tackle
this issue by inserting barriers at deterministic points in the
thread’s execution. These deterministic points are based on
the number of executed store instructions [31], the number
of issued instructions [35] or the number of executed instruc-
tions [34], [33]. All of these numbers are extremely sensitive
to small program variations, which makes such systems an
ill fit for use in diversified replicae.
Conversion [29] does not use a global barrier but, like
other DMT systems, it relies on a deterministic token that
can only be passed when threads invoke synchronization
operations, which again is incompatible with parallel pro-
grams in which some threads never invoke synchronization
operations. RFDet [32] uses an optimized version of the
Kendo algorithm [31] to establish a deterministic synchro-
nization order. Like Kendo however, the order is still based
on the amount of executed instructions in each thread,
which makes RFDet equally sensitive to program variations.
4.3 Record/Replay
Record/Replay (R+R) systems capture the order of synchro-
nization operations in one execution of a program and then
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enforce the same order in a different execution. This can
happen offline, by capturing the order in a file to be replayed
during a later execution of the same program, or online, by
broadcasting the order directly to another running instance
of the program. In the absence of data races, R+R systems
show many similarities with DMT techniques that impose
weak determinism.
RecPlay is a prime example of an offline R+R system [39].
During recording, RecPlay logs Lamport timestamps for
all pthread-based synchronization operations [40]. During
subsequent replay sessions, synchronization operations are
forced to wait until all operations with a earlier times-
tamp have completed. Because it only enforces the order
of synchronization operations, RecPlay’s replication mecha-
nism incurs less overhead than preexisting techniques that
replicate the thread scheduling order or the order in which
interrupts are processed [55]. Moreover, RecPlay assigns the
same timestamp to non-conflicting synchronization opera-
tions, such that they can also be replayed in parallel.
Loose Synchronization Algorithm (LSA) was one of the
first techniques that adopted R+R for use in fault-tolerant
systems [36]. LSA designates one of the nodes as the master
node. The master node records the order of all pthread-based
mutex acquisitions and periodically replicates this order to
the slave nodes. These slave nodes then enforce the same
acquisition order on a per-mutex basis.
More recently, Lee et al. proposed Respec online replay
on multi-processor systems [37]. Oriented towards fault-
tolerant execution of identical replicae, Respec purposely
records an unprecise order of synchronization operations in
the master process and speculatively replays that order in
the slave processes. At the end of a replay interval, Respec
checks whether the slaves are still synchronized with the
master process by comparing their state, incl. their register
contents. If not, it rolls them back. While recording, Respec
maps synchronization variables onto a statically allocated
clock, similarly to our WoC agents. It is doubtful, how-
ever, whether Respec’s approach could work in a security-
oriented MVEE like ours, in which diversity in the replicae
makes it hard (if not impossible) to detect whether the
replicae have diverged at the end of a replay interval.
Other online R+R techniques rely on custom hardware
support [38], and hence are not useful for a secure MVEE
for off-the-shelf systems.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented how GHUMVEE was extended to
become the first security-oriented MVEE that can replicate
parallel programs correctly. We proposed three replication
strategies and implemented four replication agents to im-
plement them, one of which does so over a secured com-
munication channel. Our replication agents are conceptually
similar to existing tools, but unlike existing tools, they
fit within the constraints that a security-oriented MVEE
imposes for lock-step monitoring of diversified replicae.
Additionally, we proposed a new strategy to embed a
replication agent into parallel programs, incl. programs that
use ad hoc synchronization primitives, and we evaluated
the effort to do so. In the future, we plan to automate this
strategy to a large degree.
We extensively evaluated the effect of our MVEE and
our replication agents on the PARSEC 2.1 benchmarks on
the GNU/Linux platform. With our secure wall-of-clocks
agent, the best of the four agents, we achieve an average
slowdown of just 1.32x when running the benchmarks with
4 worker threads and 2 replicae.
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